Contaminated mass fatalities following the release of chemical, biological, or radiological agents pose a potential major health hazard. A United Kingdom government investigation has identified a number of areas of risk. This paper presents an outline of the findings of the study and describes specific pathways for the management of contaminated and non-contaminated fatalities. Factors determining the choice between cremation and burial are discussed. Effective decontamination remains a neglected area of study for both fatalities and casualties. 
Introduction
Exposure of civilian populations to chemical, biological, and radiological (CBR) agents is an increasing hazard of modern society. Such exposure may occur as a result of accidental release, epidemics, or the result of a deliberate release. The increasing threat from urban terrorism has compounded the already established risks from accidental release of chemicals and radiation and from epidemics. 1 The problems of mass contagion have been known since the plague first struck Europe in the 14 th Century. One serious problem raised at that time, which still is relevant today, is the safe disposal of contaminated or infected fatalities. The many plague pits that were hastily created in London and other parts of England bear witness to a problem that lies behind a modern-day CBR attack. Therefore, planning for such an event must take into consideration how large numbers of fatalities can be handled safely using normal societal arrangements. The dangers to responders from secondary contamination and from infection are a major aspect of concern following any CBR attack. Unlike trauma that results from physical causes, some CBR agents have a significant latency of action and may persist in the environment to a variable degree. Thus, emergency responders must wear suitable personal protective equipment (PPE) while managing contaminated casualties as do those who work with the contaminated fatalities.
The type of protection worn may vary according to the nature of the hazard, but is designed to minimize the risk of harm to emergency responders from the external and internal effects of CBR agents. 2 For example, during an epidemic, there are well-established guidelines in place for the management of infected patients including disposable protective gowns and masks to protect against infection through the respiratory route. Similarly, management of the release of radionuclides follows a strategy that is similar to that for the management of exposure to chemical agents. If worn correctly, personal protective equipment such as gloves and respiratory masks should prevent the ingestion and inhalation of the material with the main hazard of exposure to alpha and most beta-emitting radionuclides. However external irradiation for certain radionuclides, in particular gamma emitters, poses an additional hazard, and
Review of Existing Evidence
The first stage in the project was a review of existing information that might be of relevance to the management of CBR mass fatalities and the current understanding of how fatalities would be managed. This information was gathered through detailed literature reviews and interviews with key personnel involved at all stages of the chain of management of fatalities, and was reviewed by the stakeholder group. The current CBR detection, identification, and monitoring (DIM) capability of emergency services also was reviewed, and brief research into DIM technological advances was conducted within the chemical and biological work streams.
Development of Body Process Pathways
The stages in the management of fatalities were termed the Body Process Pathway (BPP). Based upon the information gathered during the study, the teams developed a BPP algorithm for the management of non-contaminated mass fatalities that covers all stages and decisions involved. The teams then developed BPP algorithms for the management of contaminated or infected fatalities from overt and covert incidents (CBR-BPP).
Risks to Responders
The risks to personnel involved in the CBR-BPP and to the public were identified and assessed for the following potential exposure groups: (1) persons handling the fatality, either directly or indirectly (for example, first responders, pathologists, funeral directors, crematoria, or cemetery workers); (2) members of the public following disposal of the fatality by cremation; (3) members of the public following disposal of the fatality by burial; (4) persons coming into contact with secondary waste (incinerator, landfill, and sewage treatment plant workers); and (5) members of the public following disposal of secondary waste. A range of scenarios that took into account the levels of contamination or infectiousness and different numbers of fatalities allowing the project team to address issues concerning the type and scale of the incident was considered.
For radiological agents, unlike the other agents, there are data on the environmental behavior of radionuclides and on the doses to different body organs from given intakes. This allows mathematical models to be developed to assess the likely exposures. For example Smith, Ansari, and Harper 5 estimated the external dose rates to surgical personnel while treating patients with blast injuries contaminated with radioactive shrapnel, and Cooper, Walmsley, and Charles assessed the radiological impact of cremating corpses containing radioactive material as a result of earlier medical treatment. 6 Hence, in this study, models were developed to estimate exposures to persons coming into direct contact with the fatalities (first responders, pathologists, funeral and crematorium staff, and members of the family), exposure of members of the public following burial and cremation of the fatalities, and exposure of workers coming into contact with secondary waste.
For chemical agents, assessments were made on the basis of the physico-chemical attributes of the agents. Unlike radiological agents, modeling was not possible due to insufficient information on environmental behavior; therefore, it was not this is managed either by maintaining a safe distance from the source or by controlling the time spent in the vicinity of the contamination and by using shielding, if necessary.
In any massive release of CBR agents, emergency resources are focused toward safe provision of care for the injured and ill. However, the number of fatalities may be considerable. This raises the potential problem of the risks posed to responders from contaminated bodies and the problem of how to dispose of such fatalities safely. Not only would primary emergency responders such as fire, ambulance, and police personnel potentially be at-risk of secondary contamination, but also would all of those involved in the management of the deceased including pathologists, the clergy, and mortuary personnel. A large number of fatalities may require the establishment of temporary mass mortuaries. Families who wish to pay their respects to the deceased also are potentially at risk from contamination. In short, the potential for further mass exposure to CBR agents in the time period after the initial attack may create a health and social problem that amplifies the effects of the initial attack.
To address the problem of handling mass fatalities, in May 2004, the United Kingdom Interior Ministry (the Home Office) initially published guidance on dealing with fatalities in emergencies. 3 In 2005, the Home Office asked the UK Health Protection Agency (HPA) to investigate how to safely recover, handle, store, examine, and dispose of CBR contaminated fatalities in order to support a revision of the guidance. The study considered the management of mass fatalities from both overt and covert incidents. 4 Overt incidents usually are recognizable by the presence of an announcement or a recognizable event, e.g., an explosion. Conversely, a covert incident is one that is not instantly recognized as a potential deliberate release, e.g., an unannounced contamination of a food source with an agent. Different approaches for the management of mass fatalities are required in both situations. This paper identifies the problems and describes an algorithm for proposed management. It should be noted that the terms of reference of this study were to consider only mass fatalities from chemical, biological, and radionuclide release. Fatalities from conventional trauma following the detonation of nuclear or conventional explosive devices (often classified along with CBR as CBRNE agents) were not part of this remit.
Methods

Organization
The study performed out by three specialized teams from the Chemical Hazards, Infectious Diseases, and Radiological Protection Divisions of the HPA. The HPA was formed in 2003 from the former National Health Service and national advisory bodies that worked individually with chemical, infective, and radiation risks. It now integrates the health consequences from exposure with these hazards (detailed information about HPA is available at http://www.hpa.org.uk).The team members consisted of experts on the hazards associated with a number of agents. A stakeholder group representing public and private organizations with a professional concern for management of mass fatalities also was established to comment on the findings of the project at key stages of the process. Safe Management of Mass Fatalities guidance available on decontaminating live casualties or exposed persons, but evidence concerning its effectiveness is lacking. 8, 9 However, it should be noted that, in the case of radioactive contamination, the effectiveness can be determined by monitoring following decontamination. In addition, it cannot be assumed that information on the decontamination of casualties or inanimate objects can be applied to the decontamination of fatalities. There also is a lack of information on the effectiveness of body bags in limiting the spread of contamination or infection.
Agents-Specific Findings from the Review of Existing Guidance
Chemical-There is an urgent need for specific guidance on the safe handling of chemically contaminated fatalities. The ability to identify and monitor the agents within an appropriate timeframe is crucial. Although there is extensive information available about hazardous toxic materials, there is a lack of quantitative information on the ease of transfer and uptake of specific chemical agents, which makes the quantitative assessment of risk to responders very difficult. 2, 10 Biological-The literature review regarding the handling of contaminated fatalities demonstrated that specific issues have not been addressed. However, information on dealing with infected fatalities is widely available, and specific guidance exists for some of the agents considered in this project. There also are data on agent survival and transmission, which can be used in conjunction with information on the activities involved in the management of fatalities to assess the likely health impact and develop appropriately targeted guidance.
Radiological-Although there have been a small number of incidents involving radioactive contamination and fatalities contaminated with radioactive substances, there is little information in the literature relating to the handling of the fatalities. There is some UK guidance on the handling of fatalities containing radioisotopes used in medical procedures, but this only considers a limited range of radionuclides and this is not directly relevant to contaminated fatalities. 11 The main guidelines for managing radioactive fatalities from a terrorist incident are from the US Army and Government. 12, 13 This guidance contains procedures on the control of the incident site, the level of PPE required, and the processes used. Dose criteria for responders and existing monitoring equipment also were identified in the review.
Body Process Pathways
The algorithms for dealing with non-contaminated and contaminated fatalities, developed from the review, are diagrammed in Figures 2 and 3 , respectively. In addition, in an overt CBR incident there are two alternative BPPs that a fatality can follow (Figure 4 ). These are:
1. A "low-risk" pathway, is one in which the fatality essentially follows a conventional BPP once it is removed from the point of contamination. At the scene, decontamination occurs and following this, the fatality is taken from the scene to a mortuary. Here an autopsy may be performed, and identification procedures occur. Then, the fatality is taken from the possible to determine doses to responders. The toxicity, latency, persistency, and ease of transmission through the environment of the agents were considered, and were used to estimate risks to responders and the risk of secondary contamination. 7 For biological agents, as for chemical agents, it also was not possible to determine doses to responders or members of the public. However, data on survival and transmission of infectious agents were used, as well as knowledge of the processes and procedures during the CBR-BPP, to estimate the risk of exposure. Information on cremation and waste disposal incineration temperatures confirmed that biological agents would not survive these two processes.
Results
General Findings
There are a number of factors to be considered when defining the best practice guidance for disposal of mass-fatalities ( Figure 1 ). These include: (1) ensuring an organized multiagency response to the hazards presented by a contaminated or infected fatality; (2) identifying the agent, so that the necessary specific precautions can be implemented; (3) ensuring safe management of the fatality to minimize harm to those involved in responding to the incident; (4) identifying the best methods for transportation, storage, and disposal of the fatality so that there is little or no impact on others and the environment; and (5) ensuring, when possible, that the religious and cultural beliefs appropriate to the fatality are considered when decisions concerning disposal are made.
Specific Findings
1. Currently in the UK, there is no specific guidance for procedures to be followed when managing CBR contaminated or infected mass fatalities. Prior to this study, published guidelines for the management of CBR deliberate release incidents often failed to mention the possibility of a contaminated fatality as a potential source of further contamination, which could have short-and longer-term health consequences for others. There were indications from the review that CBR incidents are regarded by emergency responders as being equivalent in terms of management and that no distinction is made between overt and covert releases. 2. Decontamination is recognized as being essential in the management of casualties, the environment, and buildings following CBR releases, but the investigation provided no information on the decontamination of fatalities. There is a considerable amount of -Ensure an organized multi-agency response -Identify the agent causing the fatality -Ensure safe management of the fatality to minimize harm to those involved in responding to the incident -Identify the best methods for transportation, storage, and disposal of the fatality so that there is little or no impact on others and the environment -Ensure that the religious and cultural beliefs appropriate to the fatality are considered, where possible duce generic recommendations that would apply to all types of agents due to the differences between chemical, biological, and radiological agents. In the case of radiological agents, detailed modeling is possible, and therefore, radiation exposure levels were estimated for a range of contamination levels. Then, it was possible to include generic dose calculations in the fact sheets and give indicative dose rates and contamination levels at which different actions should be considered. However, this process was not possible for chemical or biological agents.
The study produced specific information on the following aspects of a CBR release, which has been included in detailed information sheets for use by the stakeholders:
1. Main properties of released agents and associated health risks; 2. Prophylaxis and antidotes for workers in the BPP; 3. Detection, identification, and monitoring methods available mortuary to the funeral director, and onwards to disposal by the normal route; or 2. A "high-risk" pathway is one in which the normal BPP is not followed, but the fatality is transported directly from the scene of the incident to disposal by burial or cremation with due protective measures to minimize the risk to others. In this case, some procedures, such as decontamination and victim identification, would occur at the scene prior to transportation. The decision to follow the high-or low-risk pathway depends largely on whether decontamination can be performed safely, the level of risk to which the person performing the decontamination would be exposed, and the degree of decontamination achievable. The decision will be made on an incident-specific basis, following a risk assessment at the scene made by the fire service (the UK emergency service responsible for the management of CBR releases). This applies to all incidents, whether they are chemical, biological, or radiological.
Development of Information Sheets
Where possible, the evidence-based guidance was supplemented by specific mathematical modeling studies. Since the evidence-based guidance varied depending on the type and specific agent considered, it proved impossible to pro- Crematoria are carefully regulated to prevent environmental hazards from emissions. Current UK regulations state that crematoria must be a minimum distance from dwellings (100 yards in London or 200 yards elsewhere in the UK). 14 The cremation process works at temperatures in excess of 600°C. 2. A crematorium can function continuously for a period of several days or weeks should the demand to cremate a large number of fatalities arise. However, only one body may be cremated at any one time in each cremator. 3. Coffins awaiting cremation require temporary storage in the committal room, and thus, the necessary space 8. Decontamination; 9. Whether forensic assessment, autopsy, embalming, and body preparation may be performed; 10. How and whether, viewing (e.g., by relatives) of fatalities may proceed; 11. Final management of fatalities; and 12. Safe disposal of waste materials.
Cremation or Burial?
Cremation or burial are the only practical solutions for the effective and rapid management of mass fatalities. The study identified a number of points related to the effectiveness and problems of each practice. 
Burial
Burial is faster than cremation for the management of mass fatalities. Burial also is advantageous in a continuing criminal investigation as any potential forensic evidence is more likely to survive. However, the potential contamination of the earth and particularly groundwater that could occur as a result of burying CBR fatalities must be considered.
Once buried, human remains vary between complete skeletonization to cases in which soft tissue remains much longer than expected, regardless of the properties of the burial soil. The majority of burials are skeletonized, with an average decay period of 10 to 12 years for a body buried in a coffin. 17 During this time, body fluids may seep out of the coffin into the ground. Studies have shown that over half of potential pollutants leach into the environment within one year. Most of the solutes have been released by the second year and <0.1% of the original potential leachate can be found by the tenth year. [18] [19] [20] Although only a few studies have been conducted in this area, results have indicated that cemeteries can be a source of groundwater contamination. Studies in the UK showed that the levels of leachate had a minor impact on local water quality. 18, 21, 22 These findings have particular relevance for CBR contaminated decomposing bodies, as the groundwater may carry CBR contamination to a much wider geographical area than that immediately surrounding the coffin, but that the contamination would be diluted with the spread.
The study showed that there is little evidence that a public health risk assessment is performed during the selection of new cemetery locations. In the case of CBR burials, the location of the cemetery and geological features of the land and soil may be important factors in reducing secondary contamination to the public. If burial is considered as an option suitable for disposal, coffins must meet specifications, which will ensure that leachate escaping to the environment is kept to an absolute minimum. In the case of radioactive contamination, however, this is not necessary if the half-life is short (i.e., of the order of 10 years).
The use of metal coffins for burial may result in contamination of the surrounding soil environment, and leaching into water sources. Metal contaminants have the potential to accumulate in soil and a single metal coffin can leach inorganic matter over several years, more so in acidic soils. 23, 24 A wooden coffin alone will not provide sufficient containment for off-gassing, aerosolized agents or leakage of fluids. Therefore, double bagging of the body is necessary, preferably using a body bag specifically designed for CBR agents.
Research has indicated that many coffins break open during filling in of the grave, posing potential health risks to those involved in the burial process and potentially contaminating the soil. 19 Green burial (burial other than in a designated cemetery) cannot be considered as an appropriate option for disposal of the contaminated dead.
The following agent-specific points are important in the case of burial:
1. Chemical-Containment of contamination may be improved by the addition of charcoal to the inside of the coffin or to line the grave given that activated charcoal is widely used in the canisters of filtration respirators for protection against known chemical and ventilation may present problems. In the UK it is doubtful whether a cremation order would be available quickly from the appropriate legal authority (the coroner) for all fatalities following a CBR release. Therefore, a storage facility at 4°C would be required. 4. Cremation is destructive; therefore, in the event of a continuing criminal investigation, would destroy potentially important forensic evidence. 5. A coffin alone may not provide sufficient containment for a contaminated body, due to the likelihood of offgassing, aerosolized agents, or leakage of fluids. Double bagging of the body is necessary, preferably in a body bag specifically designed for CBR-contaminated bodies. 6. Equipment that minimizes the time that cremator personnel spend near the coffin, or the resultant ash, should be utilized, e.g., catafalque, hearth type.
The following agent-specific points are important in deciding whether to cremate:
Chemical Agents 1. No scientific evidence from peer-reviewed sources for the incineration temperatures or thermal decomposition temperatures of chemical agents could be found. However, the US Army Regulation AR385-61 states that all chemical warfare agents are nullified when exposed to 1,000°F (538°C) for 15 minutes. 15 These conditions are met in the process of cremation in which the standard operating temperature is 600°C. 2. Cremation of metals is not permitted. Therefore, fatalities contaminated with metallic salts cannot be disposed of by cremation. 3. Gas tight, chemical resistant body bags can be cremated without generating any toxic fumes. Other plastics, however, cannot be cremated safely.
Cremating bodies in chemical-resistant bags would allow for the chemical hazard to be contained, as there would be no need to open the bag or remove the body prior to disposal.
Biological Agents 1. Cremation temperatures (>600°C) will destroy all known biological agents.
Radiological Agents 1. The combustion process will not destroy the radioactive components of radiological contaminants, and so the ashes produced and the gaseous emission products will be radioactive. Therefore, suitable measures are needed to deal with radioactive materials after cremation, which will depend on risk assessment and half-life. 2. The UK Government Guidance for Crematoria states that zinc or lead-lined coffins, that would probably be used to contain gamma emitting radioactively contaminated bodies, may not be cremated. 16 3. The cremator will become contaminated and may need decontamination or replacement of the lining.
identified. For radiological agents with a detectable radiation signature, rapid identification of an isotope and its properties is possible, allowing for risk assessment. Biological agent release may incur a time lag before the organism can be identified, and during this intervening period, recommendations following the precautionary principle have been made. For chemicals, although many chemical classes or groups can be identified at an early stage using DIM technology or patho-physiological criteria, it is possible that an incident could occur in which the agent will not be identified; in this case precautionary recommendations have been described. Dealing with contaminated fatalities will generate contaminated waste. Although the quantities involved probably will be small compared to the total amount of contaminated waste that will arise during the clean-up of an incident, the disposal of the contaminated waste from the management of fatalities must be carefully planned.
A number of issues relate to cremation or burial as a suitable method of fatality management. The choice of method will depend on many factors, including available resources, number of fatalities, proximity of residential areas, ground water conditions, and the requirement for the preservation of forensic evidence.
Identification of the Remains
After recognizing that guidance was required on the management of fatalities in emergencies, a paper was issued by the Home Office and Cabinet Office of the UK, describing the role of the UK Identification Commission, an important element in managing fatalities in an emergency. 26 It follows internationally adopted protocols in keeping the identification process under continual supervision, and directs procedures, monitors progress, and scrutinizes all evidence relating to identity. Victims will not be released until the coroner is satisfied, based on the evidence before the Identification Commission, that the identification is correct. The guidance notes that: "recovery will be conducted under the overall supervision of the scene evidence recovery manager and carried out as part of a carefully documented process. This process normally will use nationally recognized victim labels and recovery booklets each bearing a unique reference number. In addition to contemporaneous documentation, the process may be supported by video and still photography." 26 The paper contains no specific definition of what constitutes a body. Essentially the test will be whether the quantity of remains found is sufficient enough to prove death.
In the event that the number of fatalities overwhelms the capacity of local and regional responders a decision concerning the best method of identification (i.e., the use of DNA) may need to be taken by the Government. Such a decision will need to be based on the view of the coroner and the advice of the Identification Commission as to the effectiveness of identification methods in the specific context of the incident.
The study reported in this paper identified the following significant areas requiring further work:
1. Although decontamination is recommended and vital to the process of handling contaminated fatalities, there are few data openly available on the effecwarfare agents. Some chemicals are persistent, bioaccumulative, and toxic in small concentrations. The site and depth of burial must be determined carefully if this method of disposal is to be used. 25 
2.
Biological-There are no documented instances of transmission of contamination or infection to those involved in burial, but there are potential health and environmental implications from this practice, in particular, the potential for groundwater and soil contamination by organisms that can survive for prolonged periods. 3. Radiological-Burial is the recommended method for the management of fatalities who are contaminated with radioactive materials. In this case, mathematical modeling is possible to provide criteria for the choice of a burial site for different levels of contamination and different agents.
Discussion
This study has shown that the management of contaminated fatalities following a CBR incident is not as well understood or planned as the management of contaminated survivors. For all types of CBR release, obtaining appropriate and incidentspecific expert advice is essential, and a risk assessment should be performed before recovery of fatalities commences.
Following the release of a CBR agent, decontamination at the scene of death is recommended as the most effective way to minimize risks further down the BPP. Specific recommendations may depend on the results of detection, identification, and monitoring procedures, and whether a decision is made to decontaminate the body or to place it in a body bag and just decontaminate the exterior. This decision will be based on risk assessment, and whether there is capability, (appropriate personnel and equipment) to decontaminate the body rather than the bag.
There are many questions arising from the process of decontamination, starting with: who will carry out the procedure and where? Other issues include how effective it is and the disposal of the contaminated water that arises as a result. During an incident and the handling of fatalities, it is important that not only the first responders, but also those further down the BPP, must be aware of the hazards and the appropriate actions required. In the case of deliberate release, decontaminating the fatality may interfere with forensic assessment and would not be permitted until samples have been taken.
The detection, identification, and monitoring of an agent at an early stage is crucial to enable specific recommendations for safe handling; this is possible for many, but not all, agents. This identification may be achieved rapidly at the scene through the utilization of detection, identification, and monitoring (DIM) instruments that are available for some radiological and chemical agents. The role of DIM equipment for the rapid detection of a biological agent is less developed, and assessment requires laboratory confirmation. Laboratory methods also may be needed for some chemical agents, and this process may take days for the results of the tests to be available. It is important that if monitoring of the contamination levels is possible, then the results should be recorded and available to those assessing the risk of handling the fatality. Recommendations must be made for precautions to be taken if the agent has not been ity management. Different pathways (high and low risk) must be followed, depending on whether or not decontamination has taken place or the residual level of contamination.
Management of contaminated fatalities remains a neglected area in disaster management and further work is required, particularly on the effectiveness of decontamination methods.
Post-Study Note
Since this study was carried out in 2005, the UK Home Office has established a work stream to put in place a capability to safely handle contaminated fatalities. This work stream has addressed many of the issues raised by the research, and there now is an agreed process for handling contaminated fatalities, a cadre of personnel trained in this area, and a set of equipment to support the process. Work in this area continues and the HPA and the Home Office are working collaboratively with other partners to ensure any outstanding issues are resolved. tiveness and efficiency of decontamination methods. Decontamination, both of the injured and of fatalities, requires considerable further research; 2. Application of the body process pathways requires a coordinated training program for all involved in the stages of the BPP; 3. Specific contingency plans are required for CBR releases before any event occurs; 4. The possibility of a mixed incident involving more than one agent; 5. Storage and capacity issues arising from the potential scale of the incident; and 6. Problems associated with repatriation of fatalities.
Conclusions
Safe management of contaminated fatalities following CBR releases is essential to avoid further injury and loss of life. A United Kingdom Government investigation has considered this problem in detail. The risks associated with contaminated CBR fatalities depend on the nature of the hazards and a number of environmental factors encountered during handling.
Body process pathway algorithms have been developed to provide guidance to those involved at all stages of mass fatality handling. Persistency is a major factor determining fatal-
